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Comments

Rape: The Unstated Sentence

Homosexual rape has been recognized as a problem in American prisons for many years.' The problem appears to be a malady universally associated with correctional confinement. 2 The situation is especially
serious in institutions housing males. For this reason, the need is great for
the examination of homosexual rape in male occupied correctional institutions. While experts seem unable to estimate accurately the incidence of
sexual assault among inmates, they admit that the problem is serious and
has grave effects upon the victims.'
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
"cruel and unusual" punishment.4 A formal sentence assigning a criminal
to five years in a state penitentiary as a sexual pawn to a gang of fellow inmates would attract nationwide attention for its uniqueness and cruelty.
Any judge who imposed that type of sentence would be inviting reversal
and perhaps a reprimand. While sentences are not imposed in terms so
graphic, the stark reality is that for certain particularly vulnerable offenders, a conventional prison term all too often may carry with it a sentence of
prolonged captivity under the constant threat of sexual assault.' Increasto recognize and consider this fact when seningly, judges are beginning
6
offenders.
tencing certain
Convicts who are particularly vulnerable to sexual assault deserve protection from this type of abuse while serving their terms. The eighth
amendment apparently promises that protection. Legal and practical re1. LOCKWOOD, PRISON SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 6-7 (1980); Note, SexualAssault and
ForcedHomosexual Relationships in Prison: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 ALB. L.

REV. 428,431(1972).
2. Rideau & Sinclair, Prison:The Sexualiungle,in MALE RAPE at 3-4 (A. Scacco,
Jr. ed. 1982).

3. See infranotes 55-69 and accompanying text.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive

fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Id.

5.

See infranotes 36-49 and accompanying text.

6. Judge Barbieri, Court of Common Pleas, issued an unpublished order Sept. 26,
1968. See D. MCNAMARA & SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME, AND THE LAW 156 (1977).
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alities, however, make this promise rather hollow. Bureaucratic obstacles
and considerations of federalism often work to deny victimized inmates
any meaningful relief.8 The purpose of this comment is to outline the
causes of action currently available to highly vulnerable offenders, to
point out inadequacies of these actions, and to suggest innovative theories
for relief.
This comment will commence with a survey of the literature discussing
the prevalence and effects of sexual assault in correctional institutions,
and identifying the victims and aggressors.9 An analysis of sexual assault
in the context of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution
will follow. This analysis will reveal that the likelihood for relief under the
federal Constitution is questionable, particularly in light of recent United
States Supreme Court interpretations of the prohibition against "cruel
and unusual" punishment.'" The federal district court case of Mostyn v.
Carlson," which contained an inmate's allegations of confinement under
cruel and unusual conditions including sexual assault, will be examined in
context with these recent Supreme Court decisions. An argument will be
made that under current federal constitutional law, a particularly vulnerable inmate may have a better chance for preventative relief under California constitutional principles."1 The sympathetic approach of the
Californiajudiciary toward the defense of "necessity" for the crime of escape tends to support this view.' 3 The California cases of People v.Anderson14 and People v. Lovercamp15 will be shown to support an independent
interpretation of the California Constitution, which is more favorable to
inmate suits. 6 Finally, alternatives to conventional sentencing will be
suggested, with special
emphasis on practicable options for highly vulner7
able first offenders.
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

To appreciate the urgency of finding a consistently useful theory of relief for highly vulnerable prisoners, several aspects of the problem must be
7. See infra notes 100-54 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 18-69 and accompanying text.
10. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979);
see infra notes 100-54 and accompanying text.
11. Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-2687 (E.D. Cal. April 20, 1983) (order granting preliminary injunction); see infranotes 132-54 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 152-201 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
14. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152(1972).
15. 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974).
16. See infra notes 166-201 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
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understood. The first aspect to be discussed is the statistical incidence of
sexual assault. This discussion will be followed by an identification of the
likely victims and aggressors of homosexual rape. Finally, the effects of
sexual assault upon the victim will be examined.
A.

Statistics

Criminologists and psychologists agree that violence among prisoners,
and especially sexual assault, is a very real problem.18 Statistical litera19
ture, however, is scant, and the literature that does exist is contradictory.
Some commentators have stated that actual rapes are rare.20 Conversely,
other studies have produced shocking figures that suggest that the incidence rate for sexual assaults hovers at over 40% for particularly vulnerable inmates in some institutions.2
One of the most recent independent studies analyzed the incidence
rates of reported and unreported 22 sexual assaults that occurred at an unnamed California prison.3 The researcher concluded that 14% of the inmates at that prison would be sexually assaulted while incarcerated.24 The
California Department of Corrections, in an official 1974 report, listed a
rape incidence of 4.3 per 100.25 Because of notoriously poor reporting
26
records, however, that reported rate is believed to be low.
A low recorded rate for the incidence of rape does not indicate that the
problem is nonexistent. Any thorough analysis of these rates must consider that the records upon which the official statistics are based suffer
from gross underreporting.2 7 Several factors discourage inmates from reporting assaults. Prisoners often fear reprisals from the very assailants
18. See People v. Harmon, 220 N.W.2d 212, 213 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974); P. Clute,
The Legal Aspects of Prisons and Jails 74 (1980); D. LOCKWOOD, PRISON SEXUAL VIOLENCE2 (1980); MALE RAPE vii (A. Scacco, Jr. ed. 1982); Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of PrisonConfinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke andFederalCourtSupervision of
State Prison Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893, 913
(1977).
19. Compare D. LOCKWOOD, PRISON SEXUAL VIOLENCE 92 (1980) with C. FELTON, VIOLENCE IN PRISON (paper presented to Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences
(1979), cited in L. BOWKER, PRISON VICTIMIZATION 21 (1980)).
20. LOCKWOOD, supranote 18, at 92.
21. W. WOODEN & J. PARKER, MEN BEHIND BARS: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN
PRISON 18 (1982). Inmate interviews in a California state institution indicated 14% overall
rate of sexual assault, with homosexuals reporting the highest rate of attacks at 41%. Id.
22. "Unreported" incidents refer to assaults which do not appear on official prison
records but which were corroborated by other inmates. Many times inmates simply do not
report these attacks to the guards. See infranotes 28-32 and accompanying text.
23. WOODEN & PARKER, supranote 21, at 5.
24. Id. at 18.
25. L. BOWKER, PRISON VICTIMIZATION 24-25 (1980).
26. Id at 26. Bowker also estimates that a prisoner serving a twenty year sentence
runs a 1 in 67 risk of being murdered while incarcerated. Id
27. Id. at 2-3. One hundred fifty-six assaults were documented, yet only 96 were reported, and, of those, only 64 were actually listed in prison records. Id
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they would report.28 The "Convict Code," the unwritten rules of conduct
enforced by the inmates themselves, mandates punishment for "ratting." 9 Furthermore, inmates are unlikely to be eager to publicize their
humiliating experiences. Once a prisoner acquires a reputation as a "punk
boy,"3 he is vulnerable to even further harrassment and attack.3' This
reputation can follow the inmate from one institution to the next. In addition, many victims also fear the reaction of their families to news that they
are no longer "real" men.32

An accurate statewide picture of the problem of homosexual rape in the
California penal system, then, is almost impossible to obtain. Beginning
in 1983, however, the California Department of Corrections began tabulating more accurately the incidence of sexual assaults.33 Before 1983, all
sexual incidents, including consensual sexual behavior, were grouped together under the heading of "sex." 34 Only obvious sexual assaults were included under incidents of "assault. ' 35 This change in reporting method
indicates that the state has finally recognized the need for accurate and
meaningful monitoring of prison sexual violence. This closer analysis of
the sex-related incidents in California prisons should alert officials that
certain types of prisoners are the most likely victims of rape because not
all inmates are equally vulnerable to sexual victimization.
B. Victims andAggressors

Despite the lack of agreement over incidence rates, a consensus on the
characteristics of the classic victim does exist.36 The most vulnerable inmate typically is a white, middle-class male with a slight build who possesses a youthful and attractive demeanor. 37 He is also likely to be a first
offender who has been convicted of a property crime, such as car theft.
This offender need not have a violent encounter with a victim to perpe-

28.
21, at 60.
29.

See People v. Harmon, infra note 188, at 214; WOODEN & PARKER, supranote
See H. TOCH, LIVING IN PRISON: THE ECOLOGY OF SURVIVAL 166-67 (1977).

30. The term "punks" in the prison context, refers to young, small inmates who are
used for the sexual gratification of older stronger inmates. Tucker, A Punk's Song: View
from the Inside,in MALE RAPE 66 (A. Scacco, Jr. ed. 1982).
31. See BOWKER, supranote 25, at 14-15.
32. See generally id. at 1.
33. Telephone interview with Richard Bass, Research Analyst for Offender Infor-

mation Services for California Department of Corrections (Aug. 3, 1983) (copy on file at office of the PacificLaw Journal).
34. ld; Offender Information Services Branch, California Department of Corrections, Inmate Incidents in Institutions 1970-1982, Table 2 (May 4, 1983).
35. Id
36. See BOWKER, supranote 25, at 11; LoCKWOOD, supranote 1, at 33-36.
37. BOWKER,supranote25,at 11.
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trate his crime.38 He usually does not project a dangerous personality.39
Inexperienced and lacking an air of machismo, this type of inmate is a
prime target for sexual victimization.
In addition to youthful first offenders, two other categories of inmates
are highly vulnerable to the threat of sexual assault: male-to-female
transsexuals and effeminate gays.' Transsexuals in the final stages of
transformation are particularly vulnerable because of their feminine appearance and mannerisms.41 For these individuals who have not yet completed their transformation, life in a male penitentiary can be terrifying.
The vulnerable inmate often is left with limited choices for survival. A
violent outburst in reaction to the very first sexual advance is often considered by veteran inmates to be the best defense to a future encounter. 42
This response also establishes a "straight" image.43 If the prisoner is unable or unwilling" to make a physical display of his dangerousness, often
the safest course of action for a target is to find an older, stronger
'Jocker." 45 A jocker is an inmate who offers the target some measure of
protection in exchange for a long-term commitment to give the jocker
whatever sexual favors he requests.46 Unfortunately, the target will remain subject to the whims of his "protector." The unwritten convict code
sanctions only two types of pairing, jocker and punk boy or effeminate
homosexual. Even professed homosexuals are not tolerated as couples.47
Each homosexual is expected to pair up with ajocker.
To protect the victim of sexual violence as adequately as possible, likely
aggressors must be identified and efforts must be made to understand
their motivations. Aggressors, interestingly enough, consider themselves
to be heterosexual, which is one reason why they pick on inmates who
more closely resemble females.48 Unfortunately, in our penal institutions
today, an inmate's manhood and physical prowess most commonly are
38.

Id.

39.

See id.

40. See Note, The Rights of Gay Prisoners:A Challengeto ProtectiveCustody, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (1980); Gardner, For Transsexuals,Prison is "Ten Times as
Tough," CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE Feb. 1981, at 32,32-33.

41. BOWKER, supranote25, at 141.
42. Id. This sort of self-help remedy is often recommended by the guards themselves when an inmate complains of sexual harrassment; however, it will often result in
punishment, delayed release or parole. Id. LOCKWOOD, supranote 1, at 141.
43. Id.
44. During the Vietnam War many conscientious objectors of the Quaker faith
were imprisoned. Because of their pacifist beliefs, they were highly vulnerable. They refused to fight back when assaulted. Tucker, TheA ccount ofthe White House Seven, in MALE
RAPE 30-57 (A. Scacco, Jr. ed. 1982).
45. "Jocker" is the term used for the aggressor in a prison rape. He plays the masculine role while the "punk" or effeminate gay plays the submissive feminine role. See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 526 (1978).

46.

WOODEN & PARKER, supranote 21, at 18.

47. Id at 19.
48. LOCKWOOD, supranote 1,at 32.
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demonstrated by raping his fellow inmates.4 9
From all reports, aggressors are predominantly black." Numerous theories have been advanced for this phenomenon. Sociologists have suggested that blacks choose white victims out of racial animosity.5 ' The large
number of blacks in our prisons does not explain the situation fully. While
the prison population is composed of a disproportionate number of
blacks,52 the statistics on aggressors and victims do not follow purely
mathematical ratios. 3 If the incidence of black aggressors were purely a
function of racial percentages, then racial profiles of victims would reflect
a similarly disproportionate number of blacks. Victims, however, are
predominantly white. Because the reason behind aggressors being
predominantly black is unclear, solutions to the problem are more difficult to design. 4 A solution, though, must be found soon because the effects on the victim inmate resulting from the threat of attack and actual
attack are staggering.
C. The Effects

The prolonged stress of living with verbal harrassment and the constant
threat of physical abuse and rape takes an inevitable psychological toll
even on inmates who are not themselves assaulted.55 Only a few members
of a group need actually be assaulted for the
entire group to feel vulnera57
ble.56 The resultant fear itself is damaging.
Specifically, fear raises the level of violence in an institution. 8 Even inmates who are not likely victims learn quickly to behave in aggressive
ways to deflect potential sexual advances.59 Also, victims often begin to

49.

50.
51.
1982).

52.

Miller, Forewardto MALE RAPE (A. Scacco, Jr. ed. 1982).

LOCKWOOD, supranote 1,at I.

Scacco, Jr., The Scapegoat is Always White, in MALE RAPE (A. Scacco, Jr. ed.

See SILBERMAN, supranote 45, at 160-61; BOWKER, supranote 25, at 8-9.

53. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 2.
54. Classification and segregation of inmates based on racial criteria, while arguably sensible based on this data, does raise constitutional issues based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and component of the fifth amendment. See infra
note 221 and accompanying text.
Unfortunately, all too often prison guards themselves have been documented as aggressors. Bartolls, StaffExploitation of Inmates: The Paradoxof InstitutionalControl,in
MALE RAPE 195 (A. Scacco, Jr. ed. 1982). Correctional institutions are increasingly sensitive to this outrageous situation and are making efforts to screen job applicants better and
abolish the practice of using other inmates as supervisors. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.
362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). This comment, however, will focus on intra-inmate violence.
55. See BOWKER, supranote 25, at 15.
56. LOCKWOOD, supranote 1, at 143.
57. Once a victim has submitted from fear he may begin to doubt his masculinity.
See id at 1.
58. See infranotes 59-61 and accompanying text.
59. BOWKER, supranote 25, at 15.
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react violently in an attempt to end their submissive roles. 60 The brutalization of the victim is poignantly displayed by one victim's comment: "Even
though I defeated fear with hate, I destroyed myself."61
Exposure to rape or the threat of rape, in addition, also may effect a
young inmate's sexual orientation permanently. 62 Some psychologists
suggest many professed homosexual inmates might not be homosexual
had they never been incarcerated under conditions that subjected them to
being physically abused or to witnessing the sexual victimization of fellow
youthful inmates. 63 Many youthful offenders who have been sexually exploited throughout their incarceration find64 heterosexual relationships
very difficult to establish upon their release.
Inmates who are unable to break out of their victim role often take the
path of least resistance and submit consensually.65 Some of these inmates
are unable to accept the demoralizing experience of becoming prison
"prostitutes. 66 Some mutilate themselves; 67others commit suicide.68
One of the traditional functions of imprisonment is rehabilitation.69
This function, however, will be rendered meaningless if the effects of rape
in prison continue to be tolerated. Rehabilitation seems a cruel irony for
vulnerable inmates. Victimized inmates rarely, if ever, will return to society better adjusted or less violent than they were when they entered the
system.
As demonstrated, sexual violence is a serious problem in our penal system that effects certain types of inmates more seriously than others. The
prison sentences imposed on these particularly vulnerable inmates should
not include sexual harrassment and abuse. Once imprisoned, these inmates need a remedy. The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution seems a logical basis for providing that remedy.
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION

The eighth amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishment has undergone various interpretations since its ratification. This
60. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 100.
61. Id. (from inmate interview ARE- I).
62. See BOWKER, supranote 25, at 15.
63. Id
64. See Tucker, A Punk's Song: View from the Inside, in MALE RAPE 72-73 (A.
Scacco, Jr. ed. 1982).

65.

Id at 64.

66.
67.
68.
69.

See BOWKER, supranote 25, at 1.
Id.
Id
See LOCKWOOD, supranote 1, at 142.

PacificLawJournal / Vol. 15

section will begin with the history of those interpretations. 0 An analysis of
the current status of the eighth amendment as a theory of relief for inmates
imprisoned under conditions including a high threat of sexual assault will
71
conclude this section.
A.

History

Originally, the eighth amendment was read as little more than a prohibition against punishments which had recently been abolished in England." One of the earliest decisions that expanded the protections of the
eighth amendment was Weems v. United States.73 In Weems, the United

States Supreme Court ruled that a sentence of fifteen years at hard labor
was grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime committed--falsifying a public document.74 Judicial review in that case, however, was limited to the sentence imposed and did not include an evaluation of the
actual punishment suffered by the criminal.75
Courts continued to deny review of prisoners' claims of unconstitutionally harsh treatment actually received under the inmates' imposed
sentences for the next fifty years. 76 The judiciary refused to inquire into
the supervision of state prison conditions by state correctional officials.77
So long as the official punishments mandated by state legislatures and ordered by statejudges complied with minimum constitutional standards of
type and proportion, the United States Supreme Court declined to interfere in state prisQn administration.78
In 1964, however, the Warren Court 79 began to change the previous policy of nonintervention. The Supreme Court held for the first time, in
70.

See infra notes 72-99 and accompanying text.

71.
72.

See infra notes 125-59 and accompanying text.
Note, Creatures,Persons,andPrisoners:EvaluatingPrisonConditionsunderthe

Eighth Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1099, 1101 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Crea-

tures]; see also Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted." The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).

Drawing and quartering had been a popular punishment for centuries. See Note, Sex-

ual Assaults and Forced Homosexual Relationshipsin Prison: Cruel and UnusualPunishment, 36 ALA. L. REV. 428,429 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, SexualAssaults].
73. 217U.S.3249(1910).
74. Id. at 380-82.
75. Note, Creatures,supranote 72, at 1101-02.
76. See Note, SexualAssaults,supranote 72, at 430.

77.

Note, Prison Overcrowding and Rhodes v. Chapman: Double-ceilingby What

Sltandard?,23 B.C.L. REV. 713,716-19 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Prison Overcrowding].
78. Note, Creatures,supranote 72, at 1101-02.

79.

The "Warren Court" generally refers to the years ofjudicial activism when Earl

Warren presided as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. See Note, The New
Federalism: Towarda PrincipledInterpretationof the State Constitution,28 STAN. L. REV.

297,299 n.13 (1977). The years of 1953-69 were marked by many other landmark decisions

such as Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335

(1963).
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Cooper v. Page,8" that prisoners had standing to sue under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 for violations of their constitutionally protected rights.8" The
first major cases using this remedy challenged the draconian prison system in Arkansas.82 Investigation revealed that violence and sexual abuse
by guards and inmates existed in epidemic proportions throughout the
system. 3 The cases of Holt v. Sarver(1)84 and Holt v. Sarver(11)85 identified

conditions of confinement posing so serious a threat of rape or stabbing
that many inmates clung to the bars at night hoping to escape attacks
while they slept.86 Starting with the Arkansas cases, the lower federal
courts began to develop a broader definition of "cruel and unusual" punishment as applied to conditions of confinement.
Modern definitions of "cruel and unusual" punishment have varied,
but several phrases seem to form a common thread among recent cases. In
1958, Trop v. Dulles87 introduced the idea that the eighth amendment
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."88 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court held that loss of citizenship was too severe a punishment
for desertion.89 This type of punishment offended the very dignity of
man.9" More recently, "cruel and unusual" punishment has been defined
as "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" 91 and "totally without
penalogical justification." 92 The Weems 93 concept of punishment,
"grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime," 94 is still accepted
as a definition of improper sentencing. The eighth amendment, however,
now is applied to the conditions of confinement as well as to the punishment mandated.95 One condition of confinement for vulnerable inmates is
the high risk of sexual assault. The time has come for recognition of the
right of inmates to be free from the constant threat of attack. This author,
80.

378 U.S. 546 (1964).

81.

Id. at 546.

82.

Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.

362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) affid, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).

83. 309 F. Supp. at 376-77 (inmates were used as trustees to supplement free world
guard staff).
84.
85.
86.

87.

300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
Id. at 376-77.

356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).

88. Id. at 101; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346. In Trop the Court also ruled
that "unusual" added nothing of substance to the prohibition against "cruel" punishments
as modernly understood. 356 U.S. at 100 n.32.

89.

356 U.S. at 104.

90.
91.

Id. at 100.
Greg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion).

92.

Id. at 183.

93.

217U.S.349(1910).

94.

Seeid. at 367.

95. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825
(E.D. Ark. 1969).
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therefore, proposes that the eighth amendment affords vulnerable inmates a cause of action.
B.

The Right To Be FreefromSexualAssault

Given the modern development of eighth amendment interpretations,
the question remains whether inmates have a cause of action against confinement under conditions that include a serious threat of sexual assault. 6
The first court, however, to recognize specifically an inmate's right to be
reasonably protected from sexual assault was the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. In Woodhous v. Virginia,97 the Fourth Circuit held that,
[W]hile occasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another
may not constitute cruel and unusual punishment .... confine-

ment where violence and terror reign is actionable. A prisoner
has a right secured by the eighth and fourteenth amendments, to
be reasonably protected from the constant threat of violence
and sexual assualt by fellow inmates, and he need not wait until
he is actually assaulted to obtain relief.98
Woodhous seemingly would support a highly vulnerable inmate's right
to be free from sexual assault under the eighth amendment. The court
opened the way for a damage suit against state prison officials if a prisoner
could establish that (1) a pervasive risk of harm from other inmates existed, and (2) officials were not exercising reasonable care or were creating
an unreasonable risk.99 Woodhous, however, was only a circuit court deci-

sion, and the United States Supreme Court since has interpreted the
eighth amendment in ways which well may hamper an inmate's petition
for confinement that is secure against sexual assault.
C. Rhodes v. Chapman: A Retreat?

The recent United States Supreme Court decision of Rhodes v. Chapman1" has been read as evidencing a substantial retreat from the trend toward expanding prisoners' rights developed during the Warren years.'0 '
Prior to Rhodes, several lower courts had held that overcrowding, and the
96.

See 300 F. Supp. at 831; 309 F. Supp. at 376; see also Williams v. Edwards, 547

F.2d 1206, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp .318,324-25 (1976); Gates v.

Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 889 (N.D. Miss. 1972), affd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
97.

98.
99.
100.
101.

487 F.2d 889(1973).

Id.at 890.
Id.
452 U.S. 337 (1981).
See Note, The Effect ofRhodes v. Chapman on theProhibitionAgainstCruel and

Unusual Punishment, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731, 744-45 (1982); Note, Prison Overcrowding,
supranote 77, at 746,753,760; Note, Rhodes v. Chapman: PrisonConditionsAs Crueland

UnusualPunishment,S. TEX. L.J. 374 (1981); supranote 82 and accompanying text.
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doublebunking necessitated by population increases, constituted cruel
and unusual punishment,' These courts had accepted expert testimony
warning that prolonged confinement with minimal space per inmate created stress and hostility, raising the levels of all forms of violence, including sexual assault. 10 3 Some judges had even set a minimum standard for
cell size based on experts' consensus that fifty square feet was the absolute
minimum."° Rhodes unequivocally holds that overcrowding itself does
not amount to "cruel and unusual" punishment, at least in the absence of
proofof other aggravating circumstances." 5
The district court in Rhodes originally held that the prison conditions
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 06 The inmates alleged that the
crowding resulting from a prison population exceeding design capacity by
over thirty-eight percent had created numerous constitutionally impermissible conditions. 0 7 Inmates claimed that violence had increased as08a
direct consequence of the doublebunking necessitated by the crowding.
These inmates also complained that security and staff were insufficient, as
were medical, food, and ventilation facilities. 10 9 The district court, however, was unable to find any factual support for most of the prisoners' allegations. 110 Acknowledging the modern design and facilities of the
institution, the court was able to find substantiation only for the complaints regarding a reduction in job and rehabilitation opportunities."'
Ultimately, however, the district court found that these deprivations, together with doublebunking and reduced per capita cell space, amounted
to "cruel and unusual" punishment.' 12 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, 13 but the United States Supreme Court reversed the holding. 4
Eight justices' of the United States Supreme Court declined to rule
that these prison conditions amounted to "cruel and unusual" punish-

102. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 423 F. Supp. 732,743 (N.D. Miss. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.
2d 1241 (5thCir. 1977); see alsoNicholson v. Choctaw Co., 498 F, Supp. 295,308 (S.D. Ala.

1980) (dictum).
103.
104.
105.

106.

See BOWKER, supranote 25, at 164-65.
423 F. Supp. at 743.
452 U.S. at 348-51.

434 F. Supp. at 1022. Court order allowed state 90 days to develop a plan to alter

double cells. Id.
107. Id. at 1021.
108. Id. at 1014-15.
109. Id. at 1009.
110. Id. at 1014-18.

111.

Id.at 1018.

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.at 1021.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 624 F.2d 1099 (1980).
452U.S.at352. .
Only Justice Marshall dissented, finding on the facts that the conditions of con-

finement violated the 8th and 14th Amendments. Three justices, however, joined Brennan's concurrence which emphasized that this decision was not a return to the old "handsoff" policy of pre- 1960jurisprudence but only a factual decision. 452 U.S. at 352-53.
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ment. "6 Prisoners' rights advocates find two things disturbing about the
decision. The majority opinion used language demonstrating a great deference to prison administrators' decisions" 7 and rejected the use of expert
testimony that indicated the significant effects upon inmate behavior
caused by overcrowding." 8 The majority used federalist rhetoric' 9 which
suggested that in the future, the Court would be less willing to scrutinize
state prison administrators' policy decisions aimed at coping with the
problem of overcrowding. 2 " The opinion asserted that considerations
such as crowding, reduced rehabilitation opportunities, prolonged confinement in cells, and other consequences of the strain on budgetary allotments for prisons were more "properly weighed" by prison officials and
legislators than by federal judges.' 2 ' The majority chided activist judges
saying that the courts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution.' The majority seemed to imply that state prison policies concerning conditions of
confinement should be respected.
This deference to the decisions of state prison officials followed an earlier Supreme Court decision, Belly. Wolfish, 23 that was handed down two
years before the Rhodes decision. In Bell, the majority advocated'granting
ministerial decisions made by prison administrators "wide-ranging deference."'2 4 By echoing the sentiments of this earlier case, Rhodes may have
established a pattern of noninterference in prison conditions. The current
position of the Court apparently is that state prison officials are most
competent to decide how to deal with shrinking resources and increasing
inmate populations. Given the deference paid to prison officials in Bell
and Rhodes, a successful eighth amendment challenge to overcrowded
conditions does not appear likely.
D.

Viability ofEighth Amendment Challengesafter Rhodes

A cause of action to gain relief from sexual assaults might also prove unsuccessful after Rhodes v. Chapman. An argument can be made, however,
that despite the disturbing passages in the majority opinion, Rhodes
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at352.
Id.at349-52.
452U.S.at348,n.13.
The concept of federalism as used in this paper refers to the political philosophy

that great deference should be shown to the actions and decisions of the states as states, and
is related to the old "states' rights" arguments which proliferated in the pre-Civil War
southern states. See generallyNote, PrisonOvercrowding,supranote 77, at 717, nn.36-37.
120. 452 U.S. at 349-52.
121. Id. at 349.
122. Id.at 352.
123. 441 U.S. 520(1979).
124. Id.at 547.
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should be read narrowly on its facts. This interpretation would leave viable the protections promised by Woodhous.' 2 After all, the Rhodes majority assured that the federal courts would not ignore the duty to protect
prisoners' constitutional rights when conditions
of confinement actually
126
amount to "cruel and unusual" punishment.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Rhodes, in which he wasjoined
by two other justices, offers more encouragement. This concurrence
stressed that its position was strorigly based on the findings of fact made
by the district court. Since the district court found that none of the deprivations alleged by the inmates was supported by the evidence except for
rehabilitation andjob opportunity reductions,127 the result reached by the
majority was inevitable. Justice Brennan emphasized, however, thatjudicial intervention is indispensableto the enforcement of the eighth amendment. 28 Presumably, if an inmate could prove that the incidence of sexual
assault was high enough, a federal court would hold that confinement
under these conditions constituted "cruel and unusual" punishment. The
problem, then, becomes one of gathering evidence 129 sufficiently shocking, as in Woodhous, to convince the court to overlook the deference given
the decisions of state prison officials in the administration of their institutions. Since Rhodes rejected expert testimony on the dangers of overcrowding and its effects upon inmate behavior, 3 ° a case based solely on
expert testimony pointing out the damaging effect that living under the
threat of rape has on a vulnerable inmate probably has been foreclosed.
This leads to the conclusion that an inmate would not be able to win a suit
unless he had already been raped several times and could introduce sufficient corroborating evidence of the attacks. The eighth amendment,
therefore, currently does not offer any meaningful relief for the many inmates who are living under the constant threat of rape or for those inmates
who have been raped, but who are unable to provide documentation of
their attacks and remain in danger of continued abuse. 3 '
One recent California district court case, Mostyn v. Carlson,3 2 did grant
an inmate relief based on an eighth amendment sexual assault theory. The
facts of the case, however, were strong and the ruling cautious and narrow.
This writer has concluded that Mostyn is an illustration of the limited
125.
126.

487 U.S. 889(1973).
452 U.S. at 352.

128.
129.

Id at354.
The problem of underreporting has been discussed earlier in this comment. See

127.

Id. at 347-49.

notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
130. See 452 U.S. at 348-49; Note, PrisonOvercrowding,supranote 77, at 747.
131. The difficulty of obtaining reliable corrobating evidence of prison assaults has
been discussed earlier in this comment. See supranotes 26-30 and accompanying text.
132. Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108 (E.D. Cal. April 20, 1983).
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scope of protection provided to highly vulnerable inmates under the current interpretations of the eighth amendment. These inmates need preventative protective measures. They should not have to wait and suffer
until their files are filled with sufficiently shocking incident reports to support a suit for the limited kinds of relief granted in Mostyn.
An examination of the facts of Mostyn illustrates the shocking nature of
the sexual harrassment which was an incident of Ms. Mostyn's imprisonment. In 1982, Anna Marie Mostyn instituted a suit against the Federal
Bureau of Prisons and the Director, Norman Carlson. 33 At the time of her
incarceration, Ms. Mostyn was a preoperative male-to-female transsexual
who, despite her obviously feminine appearance, retained male genitalia. 34 Ms. Mostyn, therefore, was classified legally as a male. 35 The plaintiff alleged that her confinement among the male population at the State
Medical Correctional Facility at Vacaville and several federal prisons
amounted to "cruel and unusual" punishment
because of the sexual har136
rassment to which she was subjected.
After many humiliating incidents and at least one rape,'3 7 Ms. Mostyn38
was assigned almost indefinitely to segregation units for her protection.
During the course of her lawsuit, however, she was threatened with removal to the general male population. 139 Ms. Mostyn's petition for a preliminary injunction against that type of a transfer eventually was granted
by the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of California in
14 0
April 1983 over objection by the United States Attorney's Office.
Counsel for the United States government argued that the court should
defer decisions about prison housing to the discretion of corrections administrators. 141 In support of this position, counsel cited Rhodes, 14 Bell v.
Wolfish, 143 and several Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions.144 Each
133.
134.
permanent
135.
136.

Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-2687 (filed Sept. 21, 1982).
Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108 at 4. (E.D. Cal. May 19, 1983) (order granting
injunction).
Seeid at3.
See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 43, Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108

(filed Jan. 10, 1983).

137. Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108 at 9 (May 19, 1983)(order granting permanent
injunction).
138. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 43, Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108.
Segregation units are usually used as a form of punishment. See infranotes 222- 24 and accompanying text.
139. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities, in support of Application
for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108 (filed Mar. 3, 1983).
140. Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108. (April 20, 1983).
141. Government's Opposition to Temporary Restraining Order at 8-11, Mostyn v.
Carlson, No. 82-1108 (April 20, 1983).
142. 452 U.S. 337.

143. 441 U.S. 520. Day-to-day operations are best left to prison administrators'
judgment as needed to preserve internal order and discipline. Id. at 546-48. See also supra
notes 128-29 and accompanying text.

144. Hoptowitv. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982). Inmate suit against conditions
of confinement which included abuse by guards and tortious conditions in protective cus-

1984 / Rape

of these cases involved challenges to the conditions of confinement in
state prisons. Relying on the holdings of these cases, the government argued that Ms. Mostyn's papers supporting her petition for injunctive relief failed to present facts sufficient to establish that prior administrators
had abused their discretion by exaggerating their response to the situation
145
or by acting capriciously to violate Ms. Mostyn's constitutional rights.
The district court, however, relied on the older eighth amendment cases
such as Woodhous, 14 acknowledging that the state has a responsibility to
protect the safety of its prisoners.1 47 The court granted the injunction,
thereby protecting Ms. Mostyn from transfer to the general male population. The court, however, dismissed Ms. Mostyn's damage suit against
Carlson and other prison officials and was very careful to qualify its decision to grant injunctive relief.1 48 The order was specific on one point: the
decision was not meant to set a general precedent for the confinement of
transsexuals, effeminate gays, and transvestites.149 The ruling was based
solely on the facts presented.
The cautious ruling in Mostyn succeeded in extricating Ms. Mostyn
from her intolerable situation. 5 Prison administrators were enjoined
from transferring Ms. Mostyn to the general male population. The court
also suggested keeping her segregated, and stated that if neutral administrative segregation was unavailable, Ms. Mostyn should be housed in the
female side of the institution.15 1 The court also ordered that while housed
in administrative segregation, Ms. Mostyn should have all the privileges
52
allowed to the general prison population.
The Mostyn case does little to advance the cause of particularly vulnerable inmates. The court sidestepped the Rhodes153 rule of deference by finding facts sufficient to bring the situation beyond the reach of routine
administrative decisions. Ms. Mostyn was able to document an actual
sexual assault and several incidents of harrassment while confined with
males in several penal institutions.1 54 Parts of the decision no doubt were
based on judicial notice. Ms. Mostyn was five feet, four inches tall and
tody units. Id. at 1237. "[P]rison reform is an executive or legislative responsibility." Id. "at
1246. This case goes on to cite Rhodes for support of only the narrowest remedy for an obvi-

ous constitutional violation. Id. Pepperling v. Crist, 678 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1982). In this
case, another prison conditions suit, the inmates complained of first amendment violations. Id. at 787. "The courts accord decisions of prison official's extreme deference ... espe-

cially in matters of internal security." Id at 789.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Supranote 141, at 10-11.
487 F.2d 889 (1973).
Mostyn, No. 82-1108, at4.
Id
Id

150.

Id. at 3.

151.
152.

Id at 8-9.
Id at 9.

153.

452 U.S. 337.

154.

Mostyn, No. 82-1108, at 3.
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very feminine. Little imagination is needed to recognize that confinement
of this type of person among males unable to engage in conventional heterosexual activity would be dangerous.
While Rhodes is not an absolute bar to inmate petitions against the conditions of their confinement,' 55 the case is at least an indication of the direction in which the majority of the United States Supreme Court is
moving: nonintervention except in the most shocking of cases. Not all
courts will be able or willing to make findings of fact that override the deference that Rhodes mandated.'56 Rhodes, therefore, may prove an insurmountable obstacle for many inmates. Especially affected will be inmates
merely threatenedwithsexual assaults because they cannot produce documentation of attacks. 57 Those inmates will not be allowed to introduce
expert testimony warning of the effects that fear alone can have on a prisoner. 58 Since the United States Supreme Court is unlikely, at this date, to
expand prisoners' rights, 59 inmates who are likely targets of sexual harrassment are left without a legal theory that supports their demands for
preventative steps. These inmates should not be forced to wait until they
have endured sufficient pain before the discretion of officials can be overridden. Another source of authority is needed. At least for state prisoners,
a challenge based on an independent interpretation of the California Constitution offers an alternative route for relief.
INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION

The progressive tone of the Warren Court certainly has been tempered
by the more conservative philosophy espoused by the Burger Court. 160 In
response to this trend, some state courts have developed independent interpretations of their own state constitutions to better preserve individual
freedoms. 6 ' California courts are among those that do rely on their own
state constitution to ensure the protection of fundamental rights.

155.

Wilson v. Deukmejian, No. 103454 (Marin Co. Super. Ct. 1983); see L.A. Daily

Journal, Aug. 30, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 6.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

452 U.S. at 337.
See supranotes 26-34, 131 and accompanying text.
Seesupranotes 118,130-31 and accompanying text.
Seesupra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
This refers to the Nixon and Ford appointees: Burger, Powell, Blackmun,

Rehnquist, and Stevens.

161.

Note, The New Federalism:Toward a PrincipledInterpretationofthe State Cotn-

stitution,20 STAN. L. REV. 297,297 (1977); 425 U.S. 435,454-55; see U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S.

435, 454-55 (1976) (Brennan's dissent urging such action by state courts); Michigan v.
Mobley, 413 U.S. 96, 121 (1976) (Brennan again dissented).
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A.

CaliforniaSupreme Court Cases

The California Supreme Court, as the court of last resort for state constitutional rulings, recognizes the obligation to give independent meaning
to constitutionally guaranteed rights. 62 The parameters of the right to privacy, for example, are much broader under California law'63 than under
federal law. Likewise, the rights of prisoners have received additional pro14
tection.
Independent interpretation of parallel provisions of the United States
Constitution and a state constitution is most easily justified and logically
developed when an actual textual difference exists between the two provisions. 65 For example, the California Supreme Court took advantage of a
textual variation to hold in People v. Anderson 166 that the death penalty
was unconstitutional "per se." 167 This ruling was based upon the California version of the eighth amendment contained in the California Consti68
tution which is textually different from the federal eighth amendment.
Article I, section 17169 of the California Constitution prohibits the imposition of "cruel or unusual" punishment, whereas the eighth amendment to
the United States Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual" punishment. The use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive in the California Constitution implies that both punishments that are "cruel" and
punishments that are "unusual" must be banned. This distinction encompasses a potentially wider range of punishments than the federal provision. In addition, the difference lends support to an inmate's petition for
an independent interpretation providing relief from the serious threat of
sexual assault. Although the textual variation has been noted, the definitions of "cruel" and "unusual" remain elusive.
In Anderson, the California Supreme Court took the opportunity to de162.

People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929,939-40 n.10,588 P.2d 237,245 n.10, 123 Cal.

Rptr. 109, 117 n.10(1975).

163. California amended its constitution to provide specifically for a right to privacy. CAL. CONST. art. 1,§1; see B. WITKIN, 5 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §274A (8th
ed. Supp. 1980).
164. See infranotes 167-96 and accompanying text.
165. See Note, supranote 79, at 305-07. The California Supreme Court has also been
willing to make an independent interpretation when parallel provisions are textually identical. In Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 766, 557 P.2d 929, 945, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 367

(1976), the court held that education, in California, is a fundamental right. Id. at 163-66,
557 P.2d at 942-45, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 364-67. The court declined to limit its citizens' rights
by the restrictive equal protection analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court

in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 144 (1973).
166.
167.

6 Cal. 3d 628,493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152(1972).
See id at 651, 656,493 P.2d at 895, 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 167,171. This decision

was overruled by constitutional referendum adding §27 to art. I of the California Constitu-

tion. However, §27 merely seems to negate the specific ruling in Anderson with regard to the
death penalty, not the general interpretation of the terms and their textual differences. Id.
168. 6 Cal. 3d at 641-45,493 P.2d at 888-91, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 160-63.

169.

Formerly CAL. CONsr. art. I, §6.
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fine "cruel" under the California Constitution. 1 0 The court reaffirmed its
decision 7 ' to borrow the federal definition of "cruel," first enunciated in
Trop v. Dulles," to interpret section 17 of the California Constitution, 173
the prohibition against "cruel or unusual" punishment. The Trop
formula, which defines constitutional violations under the eighth amendment, is based on an "evolving standard of decency."' 174 This standard
considers the psychological effects 175 of punishment that subject an inmate to ever-increasing fear and distress. 176 The standard is much more
liberal than the current standard espoused by the United States Supreme
Court."7 Inmates who are living in fear under the serious threat of rape,
but who have not yet been attacked, should find encouragement in the
sensitivity of the California court to punishments that are psychologically
damaging. The state court forum seems much more promising than the
federal, because Rhodes appears to have foreclosed the use of the fear of
rape as a basis for a successful eighth amendment suit.
In addition to fixing the definition of "cruel," theAnderson court reiterated the correctional policy of California. 178 Retribution and vengeance
are insufficient state interests tojustify imposing a particular form of punishment. 179 Under California law, a punishment also must be necessary to
serve rehabilitative, security, or deterrence goals. 80 The retribution language of Rhodes, therefore, may not apply to state scrutiny of state imposed punishment. The Rhodes decision considered conditions that were
harsh and restrictive to be part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay
for their offenses against society. 18' In California, prison administrators
must justify harsh conditions as serving something more than purely punitive purposes. 8 ' Conditions of confinement that include a high risk of
sexual assault, therefore, would
not be an acceptable part of the punish83
ment for an inmate's offense.1
Under these California Supreme Court rulings, a state prisoner clearly
170. 6 Cal. 3d at 648,493 P.2d at 893, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
171. People v. Clark, 3 Cal. 3d 97, 99, 473 P.2d 997, 998, 89 Cal. Rptr. 253, 254
(1970).
172. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
173. 6 Cal. 3d at 650,493 P.2d at 895, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
174. 356 U.S. at 101.
175.

6 Cal. 3d at 650,493 P.2d at 895, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 167.

176.

356 U.S. at 101.

177. While the Supreme Court has not overruled its holding in Trop, the rejection of
expert testimony delineating the psychological effects of overcrowding tends to emasculate

the ruling of Trop. See 452 U.S. at 340-49; supranotes 107-22 and accompanying text.
178. 6 Cal. 3d at 651,493 P.2d at 896, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 168; In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d
740,745,48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176,408 P.2d 948,952 (1965).

179. 6 Cal. 3d at 651,493 P.2d at 896, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
180. Id.
181. 452 U.S. at 347.
182. See 6 Cal. 3d at 651,493 P.2d at 896, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
183. Sexual assault does not improve rehabilitation. It does not improve security
since victims often become violent themselves. See supranotes 58-63 and accompanying
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could state a cause of action under the California Constitution for a violation of the prohibition of "cruel or unusual" punishment. The standard to
be met would be less than under Rhodes because no obstacle of deference
need be overcome. The standard, instead, is based on the Trop "evolving
standard of decency." This allows meaningful relief for both the actual
rape victim and the inmate merely threatened with rape. Preventative relief can become a reality. Furthermore, because of the California policy
on correctional goals and incarceration, California courts would be more
willing to scrutinize closely prison administrative decisions that impact
on conditions of incarceration. The sensitivity of California courts to the
conditions of confinement is evidenced by the recognition of a defense of
escape based upon an imminent danger of being sexually assaulted while
incarcerated. 1 4
B.

The Escape Cases

Another line of California cases, those dealing with escape, supports an
inmate's plea for relief from confinement that includes the threat of sexual
assault.'85 In 1974, a decision was rendered by the Michigan Court of Appeal' 86 which was to have a profound influence almost immediately in
California.'87 In Peoplev. Harmon,'88 the court ruled that duress caused by
the imminent threat of sexual assault was a legitimate defense to a criminal charge of escape from prison. 8 9 Until the Harmondecision, courts had
resisted this type of ruling, even when a prisoner's claim of extreme mitigating circumstances was substantiated. 90Reluctant to return an inmate
to a dangerous situation, judges had been 9even more hesitant to open the
door to escaping prisoners crying "rape."' 1
Almost immediately, a California court followed the Michigan lead
and accepted "necessity" based upon the imminent threat of serious injury, death, or rape as a defense to the crime of escape. 92 The defendants
in People v. Lovercamp were female inmates at the women's medium security facility, the California Rehabilitation Center. These defendants
claimed to have been threatened repeatedly with rape and physical abuse
text. Deterrence is not advanced because only less violent inmates tend to become victims.
Seesupranotes 38-41 and accompanying text.

184.

See infranotes 198-204 and accompanying text.

185.

Id.

186.
187.

People v. Harmon, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974).

People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974); see infra

notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
188. 220 N.W.2d 212(1974).
189. Id at215.
190.

Id.

191.
192.

Ide
43 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
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by other inmates. 193
The Lovercamp court established limited parameters for the defense of
necessity and professed not to be making a new rule of law. 194 Most commentators, however, view the decision as both new and significant. Since
1974, the case has received mixed acceptance. 95 Nevertheless, in 1982,
the California Third District Court of Appeal joined the Fourth District
in acknowledging the existence of a necessity defense to escape. 96 While
this defense is narrow, its recognition reflects the sensitivity of California
courts to a prisoner's right to be free from sexual assault as delineated by
197
Woodhous.

Although an inmate's remedies under post-Rhodes federal law have become seriously limited,' these remedies appear not to be so restricted
under California law. The legal foundation for an inmate's suit under section 17 of the California Constitution can be established by an independent interpretation of the California constitutional prohibition against
"cruel or unusual" punishment, 99 together with the correctional policy of
the state.200 The Lovercamp decision, read in conjunction with this state
constitutional framework, supports an inmate's petition for preventative
relief. Using a legal argument based on the constitutional and escape
cases, an inmate isjustified in requesting relief even before he is assaulted.
A threat of assault or a personal profile that labels him as a likely victim of
assault2"' should be a sufficient basis to seek judicial protection. The form
of this protection may be of several types.
TYPES OF RELIEF OR REMEDIES

Once an inmate has been able to establish an argument that a certain
form of confinement subjects him to cruel and/or unusual punishment,
the question of what form of relief he can reasonably expect to receive remains. The final section of this comment will survey the forms of relief
currently available to inmates.20 2 The section will conclude with this
193. Id. at 825, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
194. Id. at 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
195. In re Grand Jury Proceeding v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1979) (defendant
attempted to raise duress to contempt for refusal to testify); People v. Condley, 69 Cal.
App. 3d 999, 1008-10, 138 Cal. Rptr. 515,519-21(1977) (an affirmative defense, not an element of the crime).
196. People v. Pritcock, 134 Cal. App. 3d 795, 184 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1982).
197. 487 F.2d 889 (1973); see Gardner, The Defense of Necessity andthe Right to EscapefromPrison-a Step TowardIncarcerationFreeFrom SexualAssault,49 S. CAL. L. RgV.
110,112-13 (1975).
198. See supranotes 120-35 and accompanying text.

199.

200.
201.
202.

See supranotes 168-90 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 184-89 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 38-42 and accompanying text.
See infranotes 211-32 and accompanying text.
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writer's suggestion for a new sentencing procedure that would consider
each inmate's vulnerability to sexual assault under conventional forms of
confinement.2 °3
A.

Self-Help

The convict code, which favors private solutions, continues to influence
inmate behavior in modem prisons.2' Unfortunately, most inmates resort to self-help as a means of dealing with sexual aggression by fellow inmates.2 °5 Confronted with a sexual advance or an actual assault, many
inmates follow the advice of veteran inmates and often the guards, as well,
and fight back or attempt to escape.201 The worst part of this approach is
that the victimized inmate often finds himself punished for the assault by
losing "good time"20 7 for fighting. As a result of the assault, the inmate's
incarceration may be prolonged and his parole date delayed. 2 8 More formal means of relief, however, are available.
B.

42U.S.C.§1983

The most frequently used legal action to reform debilitating prison conditions has been a tort action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.209 Under this
legislative enlargement of the fourteenth amendment, a prisoner may receive monetary compensation for a denial or abridgment of his constitutional rights." 0 Money, however, does not compensate adequately an
inmate who has been viciously raped, nor does it ensure that his confinement will be qualitatively different after his section 1983 action has
proved successful. Courts also have been reluctant to hold prison officials
responsible for conditions that continue to exist, not so much because of
the administrator's callousness, as a lack of funding by the legislature.211
Section 1983, under certain circumstances, can also provide injunctive relief.212 An inmate, however, needs protective measures that provide for his
security before-an assault occurs and the damage is done.

203.

See infranotes 239-45 and accompanying text.

204. LOCKWOOD, supranote 1, at 47.
205. Id. at 49.
206.

Id at 51-55.

207.

"Good time" refers to credit given by parole boards for good behavior.

208.
209.

LOCKWOOD, supranote 1,at 57.
See Note, PhysicalSedurityin Prison:Rights Without Remedies?, 12 NEW ENG.

L.REv. 269,284-95 (1976).
210.

211.
212.

Id.at285.

See Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901,904- 06 (7th Cir. 1971).
See42 U.S.C. §1983.
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C. ClassificationandProtectiveSegregation

Many prison systems employ another accepted means of controlling
prison violence: classification.2 13 When prisoners are first sentenced, they
are screened according to age, history of violence, and previous prison
time before being assigned a classification code. 214 The purpose of classification is to avoid putting young, inexperienced first offenders in the
same cell or area as more hardened criminals.215 Classification appears viable since it is possible to compile both victim and aggressor profiles.
Unfortunately, recent legislation mandatingjail sentences for committing a crime with a gun,216 and a rise in the crime rate, in general, have
caused prison populations to swell dramatically. 2 7 Legislative funding
for prisons has not kept pace with the expanding prison population.218
Overcrowding severely strains the flexibility and viability of any classification system. Frequently, single rooms or low risk roommates are not
available for vulnerable inmates. Without the facilities to implement
prison classification properly, the remedy is worthless.
Additionally, efforts to classify inmates on a strictly statistical basis are
discouraged by civil rights and gay rights advocates.219 Although statistically blacks are more likely to be aggressors and whites are more likely to
be victims of sexual assaults, 220 automatic segregation of inmates on a racial basis would raise equal protection and antisegregation attacks. 221
Similarly, gay rights advocates strongly object to segregation of gays
based solely upon their sexual preferences, especially if this segregation
includes a reduction in privileges.tm
The only other method consistently used to protect particularly vulnerable inmates is "protective segregation." 223 Unfortunately, protective custody is often indistinguishable from solitary confinement, entailing the
same diminished privileges as administrative detention for punitive pur-

213. See H. BURNS, JR., CORRECTIONS ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION
363-66(1975).
214. I& at 366, 368-69.
215. See id at 369.
216.
217.

218.

219.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.
See SILBERMAN, supranote 45, at 41.

See452U.S.at351n.16.

Automatic segregation based on race or sexual orientation has been attacked on

equal protection and due process grounds. Not all blacks or masculine gays are high risk
aggressors; not all effeminate gay or young whites are high risk targets. Howarth has come
out against "protective" segregation for gays based on the reality that protective segrega-

tion usually means confinement with greatly diminished privileges. See Note, supra note
40, at 1270-71.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See supranotes 38,52-57 and accompanying text.
See generallyLOCKWOOD, supranote 1, at146-47.
Id; Note, supranote 40, at 1270-71.
SeeNote, supranote40, at 1225-27.
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poses.224 Aside from the basic unfairness of this treatment, the gravity of
the situation is magnified because the vulnerable inmate, unlike the recalcitrant inmate, must serve his entire sentence under these highly restrictive conditions. Courts have recognized that conditions which might be
tolerable as a temporary punishment are unconstitutional as a permanent
condition of confinement. 22 Protective segregation, then, is not a viable
long-term remedy for the rape victim.
D. Innovations

Other forms of relief have been suggested. 6 Victimized inmates could
be transferred to another facility in order to remove them from the influence of their aggressors. 227 Reputations, however, tend to follow inmates, 8 and the problem of sexual violence seems to permeate the penal
system. Preoperative male-to-female transsexuals could be integrated
into women's institutions or given the necessary surgery to complete their
metamorphosis. 29 Prison administrators, however, have been very reluctant to stir up the controversy that either one of these options would be
likely to create." 0 Inmates' attorneys have repeatedly suggested early release or probation for inmates who have been subjected to sexual victimization.23 ' A better solution, however, would be to restructure the
sentencing process so that inmates who are likely victims could be punished without being abused.
The remedies described thus far have inherent limitations. 232 An innovation that has the potential to be much more helpful to the potential rape
victim and to all of society is a supervised community residency program.
This remedy should be available only to offenders who have not been convicted of a violent crime. Proponents of this alternative estimate that existing programs could be expanded to include three to four times the
supervisory staff and counselling hours and still cost the state less than
what it now spends to feed, house, and supervise an inmate in a maximum
224. See Breeden v. Jackson, 457 F.2d 578, 581 (4th Cir. 1972), (dissent); Sweet v.
South Carolina Dept. of Correct., 529 F.2d 854,868 (4th Cir. 1975), (concurrence); Nadeau

v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250 (D.N.H. 1976), affd, 561 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1977); TOCH,
supranote 29, at 206.
225. Note, supranote 40, at 1272.

226. See infranotes 234-41 and accompanying text.
227. See generallyMostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108 at 3 (May 19, 1983) (order granting permanent injunction).
228.
229.

LOCKWOOD, supranote 1, at 146.
See Gardner, For Transsexuals,PrisonIs "Ten Times as Tough, "CORRECIONS

231.

American Bar Association Commission on Correctional Facilities and Serv-

MAGAZINE Feb. 1981, at 32, 33-34.
230. See generallyidt at 32-34.

ices, Prisoners' Rights Litigation Manual 123 (1974) (working paper available at University of San Diego Law Library).
232. See infranotes 234-38 and accompanying text.
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security unit.3 Of course, this type of program frequently is confronted
with strong community opposition. No one wants a halfway house in his
neighborhood.
The most significant aspect of the halfway house alternative, though, is
that the typical inmate who becomes a victim of sexual assault has not
been convicted of a violent crime. ' Therefore, he is less likely to pose a
threat to the community. This fact, if made known to the community,
should help lessen the hostility toward halfway houses. The threat of reassignment to a conventional prison would always remain as a deterrent to
inmates who fail to cooperate with the rehabilitation program offered by a
community supervised facility.
After examining the constitutional and humane considerations at
stake, alternative sentencing to halfway houses should be a routinely
available option for the sentencing judge in cases not involving violent
crimes. Of course, the offender would have to meet certain criteria in order
to qualify for this type of program. If thejudge thinks the offender might
qualify, he would order an in-depth psychological screening similar to the
screening routinely performed for classification purposes. If the offender
does not evidence a violent personality, if he is young, attractive, and not
heavily built, and if he lacks an extensive previous prison record, he would
qualify for halfway house sentencing on a probationary basis. Lack of cooperation would be a ground for reassignment to a conventional prison
setting. With sufficient supervisory and counselling staff and in-depth
screening on nonviolent offenders, alternative sentencing would be the
answer to the highly vulnerable inmate's dilemma. This remedy would
provide thepreventative remedy lacking under the current federal constitutional structure.
CONCLUSION

Homosexual rape is not a constitutionally or ethically acceptable punishment. It is, however, too frequently a part of a vulnerable inmate's correctional experience. The effects upon actual victims, and upon inmates
who live under the constant threat of becoming victims, are devastating
and include increased rates of suicide and antisocial behavior.235 Overcrowding, which has become the rule and not the exception in California, 6 neutralizes the positive result that an effective classification system
233. American Bar Association, supranote 231, at 123.
234. See supranotes 38-40 and accompanying text.
235. See supranotes 58-70 and accompanying text.
236. California Governor Deukmejian was quoted as saying that overcrowding in
the state prisons "has reached beyond the breaking point..." L.A. Daily Journal, Sept. 8,
1983, §1, at 1,col. 6.

1984 / Rape

could have upon this problem. 7 If rehabilitation is to remain a serious
correctional goal, California must overcome budgetary constraints to ensure the lowest sexual assault rate practicable within the state prison system.
Any aggravation of the problem falls heaviest upon the inmates most
likely to become targets of sexual aggression.238 This comment has analyzed the current status of an inmate's eighth amendment challenge to the
conditions of his confinement which include a high risk of sexual victimization. After the United States Supreme Court ruling in Rhodes, a successful challenge to state prison conditions has become less likely. Unless an
inmate has already suffered sexual assault during his confinement and
can substantiate his claims, he has little hope of gaining relief. The purpose of this comment has been to suggest another source of relief: the California Constitution.
The California Supreme Court has adopted the practice of independently interpreting its own state constitution. No longer limited to federal
interpretations of parallel state and federal constitutional provisions,
California can, and has, extended protection to the individual rights of its
citizens, including criminals, beyond the protections mandated by the
United States Constitution.
Establishment of a right to secure conditions of confinement without a
meaningful form of protection is a hollow victory. Perhaps repeated court
rulings of unconstitutional confinement will be required to spur the legislature to enact responsible legislation providing secure and humane correctional confinement. Alternative sentencing to a halfway house for
highly vulnerable inmates could prove to be just the type of preventative
form of relief that these prisoners desperately need in the interim.2 39
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